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ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT THROUGH 
THE LENS OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES 
(TTOS) 
David Orozco* 
Universities are unique environments that thrive on the research 
and curiosity of faculty and students. To disseminate knowledge and 
potentially derive lucrative sources of funding, universities have 
aggressively entered the field of technology commercialization and 
patenting. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was instrumental to 
encourage this activity and the result has been an explosion of 
university-related patenting. This activity comes at a social cost, 
however, since patents restrict knowledge transfers and may create 
deadweight losses. These costs are amplified if technology transfer 
office (TTO) activities are viewed from a narrow financial or cost-
benefit viewpoint. As demonstrated in this study, twenty institutions 
belong to an elite grouping of leader institutions that have 
financially sustainable TTO operations. The rest are classified as 
laggards and consistently operate with losses. 
This article examines why the leaders excel and why the 
laggards continue to support TTO activities when they present a 
financial drain on universities. Transaction cost economics, 
institutional theory, signaling, and expected value theory can all 
offer insights related to the organization and maintenance of these 
offices. These theoretical perspectives help to explain why 
universities engage in technology transfer. An in-depth examination 
of the highly successful Taxol case at Florida State University, a 
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laggard institution, sheds light on some of the antecedents for a 
successful, yet rare, technology transfer event. The case reinforces 
the view that technology transfer should not be viewed narrowly, 
even among laggard institutions, but rather it should be viewed as 
a strategic endeavor that involves signaling, the observance of 
social conventions and investment for broader technological and 
economic objectives. 
Two negative consequences have resulted despite the success of 
Bayh-Dole. These include the increasingly predatory and 
commercial behavior of universities and the highly-skewed 
distribution of value among TTOs. If left unaddressed, these 
problematic results may result in legislative reforms that could 
weaken the ability of universities to practice technology transfer. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
University-based patenting and technology transfer have 
received considerable attention due to several extraordinary success 
stories.1 Google, for example, offers a compelling university 
technology transfer story. In that case, Sergei Brin and Larry Page’s 
initial search and webpage ranking algorithm was patented by 
Stanford University when this pair of enterprising doctoral students 
 
 1 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989) 
(stating that “[t]he biotechnology revolution has accelerated the commercial 
development of basic research discoveries and attracted commercial interest in 
academic biomedical research in its early stages.”); Peter Lee, Patents and the 
University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5 (2013); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 77, 109–115 (1999). Technology transfer, broadly construed, involves the 
dissemination of technology to a third party. This can occur without patents such 
as in the case of trade secret licensing or through more informal knowledge-
sharing methods such as publishing a paper or technical consulting. This article 
focuses on technology transfer related to patent licensing within U.S. research-
oriented universities and any references to technology transfer will pertain to this 
more limited context, unless otherwise stated. 
118 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 1 
were employed by the university.2 This groundbreaking patent was 
later licensed exclusively by Stanford to Google, the company 
subsequently founded by Brin and Page with the backing of 
investors to commercialize their patented webpage ranking 
algorithm.3 In exchange for a long-term exclusive license to the 
patent, Google offered Stanford 1.8 million shares of Google stock.4 
Several other, more recent “blockbuster” examples of university 
technology transfer include Northwestern University’s discovery of 
pregabalin, marketed by Pfizer as Lyrica that resulted in $1.4 billion 
in licensing income and New York University’s patents related to 
the drug Remicade, which resulted in more than $1 billion in 
royalties to the university.5 
As these cases demonstrate, the incentive for universities to 
engage in technology transfer are powerful since the payoffs can be 
remarkable.6 These powerful incentives motivated universities to 
devote significant attention and resources to costly technology 
transfer activities, such as patenting and technology 
commercialization. According to one survey by the Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM), U.S. universities spent 
a total of $368 million on legal patenting fees in just one year.7 
However, patents can be costly to society and universities since they 
 
 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998). 
 3 Google’s webpage ranking algorithm patent was eventually integrated into a 
viable business model that connected online search with paid advertising through 
Google’s Adwords and Adsense programs. See Will Oremus, Google’s Big Break, 
SLATE (Oct. 13, 2013), https://slate.com/business/2013/10/googles-big-break-
how-bill-gross-goto-com-inspired-the-adwords-business-model.html 
[https://perma.cc/N297-L3VH]. 
 4 BEST PRACTICES IN STATE AND REGIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES: 
COMPETING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 226 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2013). 
 5 Richard Perez-Pena, Patenting Their Discoveries Does Not Pay Off for Most 




 6 WALTER D. VALDIVIA, BROOKINGS INST., UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL 
FOR IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1, 11 (2013) (“Stories of blockbuster 
patents have fueled the ambition of TTO heads and university administrators 
. . . .”). 
 7 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY 38 (2014). 
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offer limited-life exclusivity rights and restrict the use of 
technologies.8 If patents prevent others from practicing an invention, 
this can create a “deadweight loss” on society.9 These societal losses 
are so pronounced that universities that patent and aggressively 
enforce their rights against others have even been described as 
“patent trolls.”10 
The reality, however, is that research universities increasingly 
devote substantial resources and employ on campus technology 
transfer offices (TTOs) to handle the patenting and 
commercialization of university-related inventions.11 For many 
years, the practice of patenting and commercialization was viewed 
outside the purview of the research university’s ethical mission to 
conduct basic research that should be offered unencumbered to the 
 
 8 See Ian Ayres & Lisa L. Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 271, 281 (2017) (stating that patents “create deadweight loss 
because they are effective only to the extent they give patentees some market 
power that allows prices to be raised above marginal cost”); see Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996) 
(arguing that allowing private firms to hold exclusive patent rights requires the 
public “to pay twice for the same invention-once through taxes to support the 
research that yielded the invention, and then again through higher monopoly 
prices and restricted supply when the invention reaches the market”); see Cristina 
Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research After 
Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1543 (2004) (discussing a 
controversial federal appellate court decision whereby Duke University “would 
not be entitled to rely on the experimental use defense if its use of the patented 
materials was in furtherance of its ‘legitimate business objectives,’ which it 
defined to include ‘educating and enlightening students and faculty,’ ‘increas[ing] 
the status of the institution and lur[ing] lucrative research grants.’”). 
 9 See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 8, at 281. 
 10 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611 (2008). In one recent high-profile example, 
Carnegie Mellon University was awarded a $750 million dollar settlement to end 
a patent dispute. See Joe Mullin, Marvell Agrees to Pay Record-Breaking $750M 




 11 Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 8, at 273 (“Today, every major U.S. research 
institution has a technology transfer office . . . .”). 
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public.12 A tension arises since the appropriation and commercial 
exploitation of intellectual property rights contravenes the basic 
goals and tenets of open scientific research that most research-
oriented universities support.13 Compounding the problem of social 
cost is the fact that few TTOs are profitable.14 Year-after-year and 
with few exceptions, TTOs draw scarce and valuable resources that 
could be used to support other useful university-related activities 
such as faculty research, scholarships, and instruction. 
Technology transfer within universities was facilitated by the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.15 This federal statute gave 
universities the right to own inventions supported with federal 
research funds and grant exclusive licenses to these inventions.16 
This article will assess the efficacy of Bayh-Dole in light of the 
 
 12 Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2170 
(2009) (stating that prior to 1980 “open science norms, along with the somewhat 
complicated procedure of obtaining title to government-funded inventions, likely 
resulted in a very low emphasis on patenting university research”); see also 
ARCHIE M. PALMER, NONPROFIT RESEARCH AND PATENT MANAGEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 43–44 (1956) (“Most universities and other nonprofit research 
organizations endeavor to avoid becoming involved in the intricate technical and 
commercial aspects of patent management, mainly because they do not have the 
personnel with the requisite specialized knowledge and experience . . . . When 
patent protection is necessary, it is natural for educational institutions, as well as 
other nonprofit research organizations, to make every effort to avoid becoming 
directly involved in the intricate legal and commercial aspects of patent 
management.”). 
 13 PALMER, supra note 12, at 5 (“Whether concerned primarily with search into 
the unknown for a new idea, understanding of nature and its laws, solution of a 
specific research problem, development of a new product or improvement of an 
existing process, most scientists working in university laboratories and in 
nonprofit research organizations are content to pursue their investigations without 
giving much, if any, thought to the patentability of the results. Their research 
efforts are directed primarily to the task at hand and many take the attitude that 
wide dissemination of the results through publication is preferable.”). 
 14 VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 9. 
 15 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012). 
 16 See DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD R. NELSON, BHAVEN N. SAMPAT & 
ARVIDS A. ZIEDONIS, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 53 (2004); see also Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: 
Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 
7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 398–99 (2006). 
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statute’s purpose, which is to stimulate greater technology 
commercialization of federally-funded research. An impetus for the 
passage of this law was to stimulate greater commercialization 
efforts, particularly among universities, connect universities with 
industry and generate greater funding for additional research.17 
Another ancillary goal of this legislation was to provide the public 
with more benefits from university research through 
commercialization.18 The result after the statute’s passage was an 
overall dramatic increase in university patenting.19 
To facilitate commercialization, universities delegated the 
authority to manage university-owned intellectual property rights 
internally to TTOs. These offices are typically comprised of 
attorneys who specialize in licensing, contract-drafting, patenting 
and commercialization efforts vis-a-vis third-party businesses 
interested in licensing university-owned intellectual property. 
Staffing TTOs within universities is a yearly expense that amounts 
to several hundreds of thousands of dollars in addition to the legal 
patenting costs incurred through the use of external patent counsel.20 
Despite the increased rate of patenting within academic 
institutions, few TTOs generate enough revenue to offset their 
expenses.21 There are a few universities that earn a profit on 
technology transfer and these are referred to as leaders in this article 
since they persistently operate in a profitable manner.22 Most 
 
 17 See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 92–93. 
 18 See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting 
Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 232 (2006); Arti Kaur Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 97 (1999). 
 19 Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories: 
California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1149 
(2006); Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities 
Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 
407, 419 (2007) (stating that between 1988–2003 patents assigned to universities 
rose from 800 patents to 3,200). 
 20 At the author’s institution (Florida State University) the budget for the Office 
of Technology Commercialization nears $500,000 a year. This does not factor the 
considerable attorney’s fees spent every year to patent the university’s inventions. 
 21 Bagley, supra note 18, at 234; Valdivia, supra note 6, at 9. 
 22 See infra pp. 13–16. 
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university technology transfer activities create losses and thus most 
universities fit within the category of laggards.23 
As explained below, the Bayh-Dole Act provided effective 
property rights-based incentives to commercialize university 
inventions.24 The statute, however, failed to anticipate a challenge 
facing TTOs in relation to the unique institutional setting of 
academia.25 Academic inventors generally have a different 
perspective on innovation since they prioritize knowledge 
dissemination under open science norms and rely on these norms to 
further their research.26 Academic inventors also place a greater 
value on their status among academic peers and their reputation 
through contributions to basic research that often involve 
publications.27 Academics respond to other strong incentives to 
innovate such as tenure and promotion, awards and prestige.28 
Technology transfer offices, therefore, struggle to convince 
academic inventors to employ the patent system since it often results 
in agreements that restrict knowledge among the broader scientific 
community.29 For example, patents may prevent other scientists 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 357 (1967) (stating the “[t]he reduction in negotiating cost that 
accompanies the private right to exclude others allows most externalities to be 
internalized at rather low cost” and the Bayh-Dole Act greatly reduced the cost of 
internalizing externalities by allowing exclusive licenses to be awarded). 
 25 See Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldmann, Entrepreneurial Universities and 
Technology Transfer: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Knowledge-
Based Economic Development, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 175, 180 (2006) (“Faculty 
members may not disclose, [inventions to a TTO] because they believe that 
commercial activity is not appropriate for an academic scientist. This view 
certainly represents the established norms of open academic science that favour 
publication over patenting.”). 
 26 See Weschler, supra note 8, at 1545. 
 27 Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto Di Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory: 
Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 37 RES. POL’Y 914, 914 
(2008). 
 28 See Lemley, supra note 10, at 621. 
 29 See Danny Hakim, Scientists Loved and Loathed by an Agrochemical Giant, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/ 
business/scientists-loved-and-loathed-by-syngenta-an-agrochemical-giant.html 
[https://perma.cc/76XD-P5AG]. 
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from using technologies that are applicable to their fields of 
research. 
Scholars disagree about the merits of university-based 
technology transfer. On one hand, some scholars believe that the 
costs of patenting outweigh the benefits.30 For these scholars, the 
costs include the resources spent to patent and litigate these rights. 
Also, their view is that the restrictions on technology use hinder 
innovation and contribute to the tragedy of the commons.31 The costs 
extend beyond economics since the university culture, which is 
based on knowledge sharing, transparency, and public welfare can 
be damaged if too much emphasis is placed on private interests and 
technology commercialization.32 According to these scholars, 
academic interests suffer when universities myopically focus on 
licensing or revenue generation.33 
Other scholars disagree and view technology commercialization 
as an overall benefit to society and universities. To these individuals, 
 
 30 See, e.g., Ted Agres, The Costs of Commercializing Academic Research: 
Does University Licensing Impede Life Science Research and Development?, 
SCIENTIST (Aug. 25, 2003), https://www.the-scientist.com/profession/the-costs-
of-commercializing-academic-research-51183 [https://perma.cc/28NU-8YC3] 
(quoting Paul Berg, Director Emeritus, Beckman Center for Molecular and 
Genetic Medicine, Stanford University); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public 
Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004) (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act was “enacted to 
promote technology transfer through licensing, and not specifically to enrich 
universities”) (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored 
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1996)); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting 
Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 628 (2005); John M. Golden, 
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and 
Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 108–10 (2001). 
 31 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) 
(addressing the concern that an excess of rights in a resource could lead to 
underuse). 
 32 See Kesan, supra note 12, at 2192 (“Scholars have also noted the danger of 
possible interference with academic freedom and academic priorities.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Megan Ristau Baca, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property 
Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 4 
(2006); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 618 (2008). 
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the benefits that accrue from university patents outweigh the 
substantial costs.34 These benefits are measured as resources granted 
to the university in terms of royalties and partnerships with industry. 
The benefits also extend beyond the university as society benefits 
from the application of new technologies and enterprises. For 
example, a 2013 study found that universities had created 3,715 
spin-off companies.35 Also, entire industries such as biotechnology 
have benefited greatly from university patent licensing under the 
Bayh-Dole Act.36 According to one source, nearly half of biotech 
firms owe their genesis to university-related inventions.37 These 
measures indicate that social welfare is increased by university 
technology transfer activities. 
There is continuing debate concerning the overall social benefits 
of Bayh-Dole, and finding an answer to this question depends to 
some extent on how one defines the problem. If the issue is narrowly 
defined as whether universities on average profit from patent 
licensing, the answer is that university patenting is inefficient and 
irrational.38 On the other hand, if the issue is framed more broadly 
as overall enterprise formation and royalty generation, the answer is 
that technology transfer is efficient. The problem, however, is 
distributional since very few universities can financially justify their 
 
 34 See generally Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson, 
Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent 
Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577–98 (1993); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to 
Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); David C. Mowery et al., The 
Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the 
Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99 (2001); Osenga, supra 
note 19, at 418. 
 35 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2013). 
 36 See Mary Eberle, March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access 
to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQUETTE INTELL. PROP. REV. 155, 155 
(1999). 
 37 Bio Tech. Indus. Org., BIO 2009 Member Survey Technology Transfer & the 
Biotechnology Industry (2009), https://www.bio.org/articles/bio-2009-member-
survey-technology-transfer-and-biotechnology-industry [https://perma.cc/Q6JU-
7V4M]. 
 38 Valdivia, supra note 6, at 1. 
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TTO-related expenses and this yields a winner-take-all type of 
environment.39 
This article seeks to provide additional insights to the debate 
concerning the efficacy of Bayh-Dole by addressing and answering 
the following questions: 1) Which universities gain from technology 
transfer? 2) Since technology transfer is narrowly defined as a losing 
financial proposition at most institutions (even very well-funded 
ones), why do so many universities engage in this behavior? 3) Is 
university-based technology transfer desirable from a social welfare 
perspective? 4) Should law and policy be calibrated to encourage or 
rein in university-based technology transfer? 
To answer these important questions, Part II of this article will 
first examine the origins of the Bayh-Dole Act and how it impacted 
university technology transfer practices. Part III will examine the 
academic institutional setting of technology transfer. Part IV will 
discuss the organizational attributes, success factors and obstacles 
related to TTOs within universities. Data will be examined to 
analyze the skewed distribution of successful technology transfer 
cases at leader institutions. Several factors are analyzed to determine 
the reasons why technology transfer at universities remains an 
elusive prospect and why so many laggard institutions continue to 
invest in this speculative and costly activity. In Part V, transaction 
cost economics, institutional theory, signaling and expected value 
theory will explain what seems like irrational behavior at laggard 
universities. Part VI provides an in-depth case study analysis related 
to Taxol, a successful and unique technology transfer event at 
Florida State University. This case brings to light the relevant 
antecedents and subsequent events that might follow a rare 
technology transfer success at a laggard institution. Part VII will 
discuss various legal and policy implications that arise from the 
analysis. 
 
 39 Id. at 14. 
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II. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN LIGHT OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 
A. The Forces Behind the Passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 
A principal goal for the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was to 
stimulate greater commercialization efforts among universities, 
connect universities with industry, and to generate greater funding 
for research.40 For example the statute states: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported 
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small 
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; 
to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit 
organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made 
by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a 
manner to promote free competition and enterprise . . . . 41 
To achieve these goals the act stated that universities would be 
authorized to patent and license federally-funded research.42 From 
the outset, universities played a major role in the sponsorship of the 
Bayh-Dole Act. According to one scholar: 
[a] number of universities, including Harvard University, Stanford 
University, the University of California, and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, lobbied for passage of the bill, and throughout the 
debates representatives of these and other research universities were 
active in “commenting and helping to develop the final language” of the 
House and Senate versions of the bill.43 
 
B. Technology Transfer Pre-Bayh-Dole 
It is widely recognized that a singular moment for university 
technology transfer was the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1981.44 
 
 40 See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 85–99. 
 41 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994). 
 42 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012). 
 43 DAVID C. MOWERY, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, 16 
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 39, 50 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 
2005). 
 44 Kesan, supra note 12, at 2174 (“From a patent standpoint, the Bayh-Dole Act 
was a very significant piece of legislation during the 1980s, because it led to an 
increase in nonprofit organizations’ involvement in the patent system.”). 
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This federal act gave universities the exclusive patent rights to own 
inventions supported with federal research grants and the ability to 
offer exclusive licenses to these patented inventions.45 With the 
exception of march-in rights retained by the federal government to 
practice a patented technology without the owner’s permission, 
universities could patent and grant exclusive licenses to inventions 
funded with federal research grants.46 
A handful of universities had successfully experimented with 
technology transfer prior to Bayh-Dole, for example: Stanford, MIT, 
the University of Wisconsin, and Purdue.47 The general trend among 
state and private universities, however, was to increase technology 
transfer before Bayh-Dole’s passage.48 Other paths to deliver 
knowledge and transfer technology were and continue to remain 
important. For example, faculty publications, conference 
presentations, consulting engagements, and informal meetings are 
ways university scientists promote technology transfer without 
patenting.49 Most commentators, however, agree that the passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act was instrumental in facilitating university 
technology transfer and encouraged the explosive growth in 
university patenting.50 
Universities were key stakeholders in the passage of the Act 
even though university licensing has and remains controversial in 
relation to open science norms.51 This controversy dates back to 
1933, when a report issued by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science discussed technology commercialization 
 
 45 Id. at 2174–75. 
 46 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994). 
 47 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16. 
 48 See Scott Shane, Encouraging University Entrepreneurship? The Effect of 
the Bayh-Dole Act on University Patenting in the United States, 19 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 127, 128–29 (2004). 
 49 See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1508 
(2012); MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16. 
 50 Lee, supra note 1, at 64 (discussing in detail how university administrators 
were involved throughout the Act’s genesis and passage); Ayres & Oullette, supra 
note 8, at 272–73. 
 51 ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 464 (1973). 
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by universities and concluded that “it is unethical for scientists or 
professors to patent the results of their work.”52 
Dr. Harry Steenbock was a faculty member at the University of 
Wisconsin and he played a critical role to help that university 
establish the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the 
university’s technology licensing arm in 1925. Dr. Steenbock helped 
launch WARF by transferring his patents to enrich milk with 
vitamin D. For many years Dr. Steenbock refused to receive 
royalties on his patents since he believed it would ethically 
compromise his position as an academic scientist.53 In this way, Dr. 
Steenbock illustrated the early and prevailing norm within 
universities that sought to create a distance between the private 
commercialization aims of patenting and the public mission of 
university-related research activities. 
C. Technology Transfer Post-Bayh-Dole 
It is well-accepted that university patenting and technology 
commercialization were on the rise prior to the Bayh-Dole Act.54 
Prior to the Act, federal agencies had increased their levels of 
research funding and were looking for ways to commercialize 
research activities by partnering with industry, universities, and 
research institutes. For example, in 1986 Congress passed the 
Technology Transfer Act.55 This act mandated that federal agencies 
with research programs take steps to transfer their technology for 
commercialization.56 This act notably authorized federal agencies to 
enter into cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADAs) with external institutions, including universities.57 A 
 
 52 JOSEPH ROSSMAN & AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., The 
Protection by Patents of Scientific Discoveries, in 79 SUPPLEMENT TO SCIENCE 8 
(1934). 
 53 Rima D. Apple, Patenting University Research: Harry Steenbock and the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 80 ISIS J. HIST. SCI. 374, 388 (1989). 
 54 Kesan, supra note 12, at 2177. 
 55 Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–502, 100 Stat. 
1785 (1986). 
 56 FRED E. GRISSOM JR. & RICHARD L. CHAPMAN, MINING THE NATION’S 
BRAIN TRUST – HOW TO PUT FEDERALLY-FUNDED RESEARCH TO WORK FOR YOU 
14 (1992). 
 57 Id. at 15. 
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CRADA is a contract where an institution such as a corporation or 
a university contributes its research expertise to a federal laboratory 
to support an ongoing federal research program and obtains rights 
in any resulting inventions.58 
Statistics support the argument that Bayh-Dole encouraged and 
amplified the pre-existing positive trend of university patenting and 
licensing.59 Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, there were only a handful of 
TTOs at universities, with several others outsourcing the function 
altogether to third parties such as the privately-owned Research 
Corporation.60 Shortly after Bayh-Dole, almost all research 
universities established TTOs, with the number increasing eightfold 
to more than 200.61 By 2005, the number of TTOs at universities, 
hospitals, and research institutes totaled 3,300.62 New patent 
applications at universities have skyrocketed; an AUTM study 
reported that in 2014, 15,953 new patent applications were filed by 
universities.63 Some of largest patentees belong to the TTO leader 
category discussed below. For example, the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology obtained 360 patents in 2018.64 
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
This part provides the necessary background to examine 
patenting and TTOs within a university context. As will be 
demonstrated, the proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act failed to 
anticipate the challenges of patenting in a university setting. 
The backdrop of academic research and invention provides a 
strikingly unique setting. Unlike private industry, academia has 
various competing goals that can constrain technology 
 
 58 Thomas N. Bulleit Jr., Public-Private Partnerships in Biomedical Research: 
Resolving Conflicts of Interest Arising under the Federal Technology Transfer 
Act of 1986, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 2 (1989-90). 
 59 Kesan, supra note 12, at 2178. 
 60 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 58–85. 
 61 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2014). 
 62 Osenga, supra note 19, at 419. 
 63 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2015). 
 64 MIT Facts, MIT and Industry, MIT, https://web.mit.edu/facts/industry.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CPL-SUQQ]. 
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commercialization. First, university research funding differs from 
the private sector since a considerable portion of academic research 
is funded through grants.65 Once they secure a research grant, 
university researchers do not have a strong incentive to secure a 
patent.66 In this context, funding is assured once the research grant 
is approved. Commercialization efforts are, therefore, an 
afterthought to this process. 
The legal entity status of research-oriented universities supports 
this paradigm since they are organized either as private non-profit 
entities or public state-affiliated entities subject to legislative 
oversight. Universities do not face the fiduciary decision-making 
constraint to optimize wealth-maximization that is present in private 
business.67 Instead, universities view their primary mission as the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge and in terms of advancing 
public welfare.68 
There is also an inventor selection bias since academic 
researchers are often drawn to university environments due to the 
freedom they have to pursue general knowledge-related inquiries 
traditionally labeled basic research.69 This contrasts with most 
industrial research settings that emphasize applied research and a 
 
 65 See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1726 (stating that “[p]atent revenues account 
for a trivial fraction of overall university research budgets, while public research 
funding remains of critical importance.”). 
 66 Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 8, at 283–84. 
 67 See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and 
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 632,  
641–43 (1997) (“For-profit directors and officers are principally concerned about 
long-term profit maximization, while nonprofit directors and officers, while 
keeping economic matters in mind, are principally concerned about the effective 
performance of the nonprofits’s mission.”). 
 68 Lee, supra note 1, at 5 (“Throughout most of the history of the patent system, 
prudential interests in keeping foundational discoveries in the public domain as 
well as judicial recognition of the noncommercial nature of university science 
helped contribute to academic exceptionalism in patent doctrine.”). 
 69 See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 20 (“Basic research involves a quest 
for fundamental understanding. In the traditional natural sciences, such a quest 
has often been identified with research with no immediate concern with practical 
applications.”). The term basic research originated from VANNEVAR BUSH, 
SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945). 
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commercialization goal from the outset.70 Some of the values 
academic researchers ascribe to include reputation among the 
scientific community, the prestige of academic research, making 
contributions to general knowledge, and the open norms of 
communicating and sharing research findings with other scientists.71 
The academic institutional setting encourages these values and 
norms through its incentive system of tenure and promotion 
awarded primarily for publications that generate basic research 
findings and citations among academic researchers. Whereas patents 
often play an important role in professional advancement within the 
private sector, they are rarely used for promotion and tenure 
purposes at leader or laggard universities.72 To the contrary, 
academic prestige and promotion may be hindered if an academic 
researcher spends too much time and effort patenting their 
research.73 
The distinctions among research orientation and motivations are 
visually captured in the matrix known as the Stokes Classification 
of Scientific Research.74 This matrix represented as Figure 1 
classifies research along two dimensions: considerations of use and 
the quest for basic knowledge. If an inventor does not emphasize use 
considerations (the applied nature of technology) and is motivated 
by a quest for basic understanding they fit within the pure basic 
research, or Bohr’s quadrant. If the inventor has a quest for basic 
research and is interested in the applied aspects of technology they 
fit within the use-inspired basic research quadrant, also known as 
 
 70 There are a few notable exceptions, such as the case of AT&T’s famous Bell 
Labs. The research team at Bell Labs developed a significant body of applied and 
basic research that eventually yielded some break-through innovations and major 
contributions to science. Eight Nobel Prizes were awarded for work completed at 
Bell Labs. See Robert Buderi, Bell Labs is Dead, Long Live Bell Labs, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Sept. 1 1998), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400241/bell-labs-is-
dead-long-live-bell-labs/ [https://perma.cc/M34A-EJL2]. 
 71 MERTON, supra note 51. 
 72 Charles A. Garris Jr., The U.S. Patent System: An Essential Role in 
Engineering Design Education, 90 J. ENGINEERING EDUC. 509, 521 (2001). 
 73 See David Blumenthal et al., Participation of Life-Science Faculty in 
Research Relationships with Industry, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1734, 1738 (1996). 
 74 DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT—BASIC SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 72 (1997). 
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Pascal’s quadrant. Lastly, if an inventor does not have a quest for 
basic understanding and is solely motivated by the applied aspects 
of technology they fit within the pure applied research, also known 
as Edison’s quadrant. Most academic inventors prefer to pursue 
research within Bohr’s quadrant, which prioritizes the quest for 
basic understanding and minimizes practical use considerations. 
Industry, on the other hand, typically hires and rewards researchers 
who prioritize use considerations, or those who fall within Edison’s 
quadrant.75 
Figure 1. The Stokes Classification of Research 
 Considerations of Use? 
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An academic inventor who collaborates with a university to 
achieve a successful technology transfer event such as patent 
licensing would likely fit within Pascal’s quadrant since they will 
pursue a combination of basic and applied research. TTOs often 
struggle to find and sustain the conditions that nurture the type of 
academic researcher who fits within Pascal’s research quadrant.76 
 
 75 Even within the quadrants there is variance among inventors. For example, 
some highly innovative companies like Google seek out “T-shaped” engineers 
who have deep levels of expertise within a narrow domain and broad general 
knowledge across multiple domains. This is viewed as an indicator of curiosity, 
out-of-the-box thinking and the potential to develop breakthrough innovations. 
See JOE TRANQUILLO, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENGINEERING EDUC., THE T-SHAPED 
ENGINEER: CONNECTING THE STEM TO THE TOP 11 (June 2013). 
 76 See Vinit Nijhawan, Maximize Collisions, Minimize Friction: Applying 
Platform Strategies to Accelerate University Research Commercialization, 19 
TECH. & INNOVATION 415, 416 (2017). 
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Industry’s approach towards knowledge-based rights differ from 
academia. In industry, knowledge is commoditized and protected as 
property to restrict knowledge dissipation and protect costly 
investments in research and development.77 Free-riding and 
imitation by rivals is viewed as a major threat that prevents firms 
from achieving competitive advantage.78 Industry, therefore, relies 
to a great extent on various property, contract, and litigation 
mechanisms to appropriate knowledge for private advantage.79 
Trade secrets, patents, know-how, copyrights, designs, and 
trademarks are used increasingly by firms to protect knowledge-
based assets.80 Contracts such as non-disclosure, non-solicitation, 
and non-compete agreements are also used to expand the protection 
of these knowledge-based rights.81 Patent litigation in the 
commercial sector has also risen dramatically in the past few years.82 
Industry’s approach clashes with the open science norms 
favored by academia. Universities today, however, seek to obtain 
trademark and patent rights more so than in the past.83 Their aims, 
however, are still primarily to serve the public.84 Restrictive 
knowledge contracts such as non-competes are, therefore, relatively 
rare in academia. Industry support of academic invention is 
encouraged, although it may lead to conflicts since the research 
findings may be constrained by contractual devices such as 
confidentiality agreements.85 
 
 77 See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory 
to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. LAW. J. 979, 979 
(2012). 
 78 See Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. 
MGMT. 99, 103–05 (1991). See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE 
STRATEGY (1980). 
 79 Bishara & Orozco, supra note 77, at 996. 
 80 See generally DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: 
ORGANIZATIONAL, STRATEGIC AND POLICY DIMENSIONS (2002). 
 81 Bishara & Orozco, supra note 77, at 988. 
 82 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 402 (2013). 
 83 Jacob H. Rooksby, University TM: Trademark Rights Accretion in Higher 
Education, 27 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 349, 349 (2014). 
 84 James K. Woodell & Tobin L. Smith, Technology Transfer for All the Right 
Reasons, 18 TECH. & INNOV. 295, 300 (2017). 
 85 Hakim, supra note 29. 
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Universities may not be financially motivated, yet they face 
increasing pressure to demonstrate that they are good stewards of 
scarce research funding awarded by state agencies, private industry 
grants, donations, and legislative appropriations. The competition 
for scarce funding and reduced appropriations for state universities 
has invariably forced universities to find ways to invest in research 
that yields measurable benefits to society and provides a financial 
return to the university. For example, in Florida, a metric the 
legislature uses to determine university funding includes the number 
of patents awarded every year to state universities.86 Given the 
considerable financial rewards that can accrue from patent licensing, 
university administrators view technology transfer as a lucrative 
source of funding that also yields prestige.87 That explains, to some 
degree, the dramatic rise in patenting and commercialization efforts 
at universities, as discussed in the next section. 
IV. UNIVERSITY TTOS AS COMMERCIALIZATION AGENTS 
Universities responded to the Bayh-Dole Act by establishing 
TTOs to commercialize university inventions. This part examines 
the practices, differential groupings of leaders and laggards, and the 
growth related to the activities of these specialized on-campus units. 
A. The Goals and Organizational Structures of TTOs and Research 
Foundations 
The mission of most TTOs is to broadly support the university’s 
research efforts rather than a narrow commercialization focus. 
According to a former TTO director, the central mission of the TTO 
he helped launch in 1987 was to advance three interrelated goals.88 
First, since the federal government sponsored considerable sums for 
research, he viewed it as an obligation to translate that research into 
 
 86 FLA. STAT. § 1001.7065 (2017) (“The following academic and research 
excellence standards are established for the preeminent state research universities 
program . . . [o]ne hundred or more total patents awarded by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office for the most recent 3-year period.”). 
 87 Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 295–96. 
 88 Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, Former Dir. of Tech. 
Commercialization, Fla. St. U. (Oct. 2, 2017). 
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inventions that could benefit society.89 In his view, the TTO office 
could play an integral role since it could incentivize the academic 
inventor to that end.90 Second, technology commercialization could 
generate novel and additional research inquiries that the academic 
inventor did not initially realize.91 Third, funds generated from 
technology transfer could be applied to support additional research 
activities within the university.92 
Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, universities seldom managed their 
patenting and licensing activities in-house.93 Instead, they 
outsourced this activity to independent foundations or holding 
companies to avoid the criticism and litigation that might arise from 
managing patents for financial gain.94 The prevailing cultural norm 
in academia was to view the practice of patenting and licensing 
university research as an unethical activity.95 
According to one TTO director, separate research foundations 
help to alleviate concerns since they create a distance between the 
university and the research foundation as the patent owner.96 This is 
particularly true at state universities, which benefit from having a 
separate legal entity to bypass state regulations that could impede or 
delay equity investments in startups and financing projects such as 
infrastructure or capital improvements.97 The pioneer in this regard 
was the University of Wisconsin, which created the Wisconsin 
 
 89 Id. According to one estimate, the federal government spent forty billion 
dollars in 2014 to support research at universities, hospitals and research 
institutions. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY 
(2014). 
 90 Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, supra note 88. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 38. 
 94 Id. Some universities clearly are not deterred by the public criticism they may 
engender for aggressively litigating patent rights. WARF at the University of 
Wisconsin and Carnegie Mellon have recently been in the spotlight for their 
aggressive patent litigation tactics and the substantial windfalls these have 
generated. 
 95 JOSEPH ROSSMAN, AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., THE PROTECTION 
BY PATENTS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 8 (1934). 
 96 Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, Dir. of Tech. Commercialization, 
Fla. St. U. (Nov. 21, 2017). 
 97 PALMER, supra note 12, at 46. 
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Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) in the 1920s to 
commercialize academic inventions related to a method for 
increasing the content of vitamin D in food.98 To this day, the 
organizational model WARF pioneered has been replicated across 
various universities.99 
Following the model pioneered by WARF, university research 
foundations are structured as separate legal entities, typically non-
profit corporations, charged by their corporate charters to broadly 
support university research.100 Although research foundations are 
separate legal entities, their oversight can include representation 
from high-ranking university administrators.101 In the case of the 
more successful programs, the boards of these foundations comprise 
 
 98 Apple, supra note 53, at 390. 
 99 Id. 
 100 For example, the Florida State University Research Foundation’s articles of 
incorporation describes its purpose as: 
This corporation is organized and shall be operated exclusively for scientific and 
educational purposes and not for pecuniary profit. The corporation shall be 
operated exclusively for the benefit of The Florida State University. The 
Corporation is a university direct-support organization within the definition of 
Section 240.299, Florida Statutes, and as such is organized and operated 
exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make 
expenditures to or for the benefit of The Florida State University or for the benefit 
of a research and development authority affiliated with The Florida State 
University and organized under Part V of Chapter 159 of Florida Statutes. The 
purposes of this corporation include the promotion and encouragement of, and 
assistance to, the research and training activities of faculty, staff, and students of 
The Florida State University through income from contracts, grants, and other 
sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from or related to the 
development and commercialization of University work products. The 
corporation shall provide means by which discoveries, inventions, processes, and 
work products of faculty, staff, and students of the University may be patented, 
developed, applied, and utilized in order that the results of such research shall be 
made available to the public and that funds be made available from such 
discoveries, inventions, processes, and work products for further research at The 
Florida State University. 
Articles of Incorporation of the Florida State University Research Foundation, 
Inc., Art. III, https://www.research.fsu.edu/media/1556/articles-of-incorporation-
as-amended-by-bod-2-16-00-bor-5-17-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6M5-TLL5]. 
 101 Id. at Art. VII (stating the university president, vice-president for research, 
provost, and dean of arts and sciences must be on the board of the research 
foundation). 
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successful individuals and alumni with expertise in the areas of 
investments, technology, and business administration.102 University 
research foundations hold legal title to university-created 
intellectual property, sign license agreements as the licensors, 
financially manage the funds associated with royalties, manage 
equity investments in university-related start-ups, finance university 
capital spending projects, and administer private research grants.103 
They also develop policies for disbursing funds generated from 
these activities back to the university to support additional research-
related goals and activities. The individuals who manage and 
generate patent commercialization opportunities, however, 
generally reside within distinct organizational units known as 
TTOs.104 
B. The Process of University Technology Transfer 
This section offers an overview and analytical break-down of the 
major steps and actors involved in a technology transfer event. The 
key university technology transfer mechanisms involve licensing 
agreements with private firms and university-based start-ups.105 
The process begins when an academic inventor such as a 
doctoral student or professor fills out an invention disclosure form 
if they believe they have developed a technology that has 
commercial viability.106 The TTO reviews these forms and screens 
them to assess which ones have the greatest potential for success. 
Typically, if the university passes on the invention, the rights belong 
 
 102 For example, the WARF Board of Trustees is largely comprised of alumni 
who have achieved distinction in business. WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES, https://www.warf.org/about-us/board-of-
trustees/board-of-trustees.cmsx [https://perma.cc/9KTM-3QGS] (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2019). 
 103 PALMER, supra note 12, at 46. 
 104 See Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: 
Organizational Change at the Individual Level, 19 ORG. SCI. 69, 70 (2008) 
(discussing how the invention disclosure process begins when a faculty member 
consults with the TTO). 
 105 Phillip H. Phan & Donald S. Siegel, The Effectiveness of University 
Technology Transfer: Lessons Learned, Managerial and Policy Implications, and 
the Road Forward, SSRN ELECTRONIC J. 3 (Apr. 2006). 
 106 See Bercovitz & Feldman, supra note 104, at 70. 
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to the inventor to independently pursue patenting or 
commercialization.107 
If the TTO believes the invention disclosure has 
commercialization potential they will finance the patenting process. 
Typically, university policies for inventions allocate a significant 
royalty to the academic inventor that is preset by the employment 
contract. At the author’s institution, an academic inventor receives 
40 percent of royalties, which is in line with other research-intensive 
universities.108 During, or after the patenting stage, the TTO will 
attempt to market the technology and find a suitable licensee or 
commercialization partner. If a suitable partner is found, a licensing 
agreement is drafted and negotiated that includes an initial term 
sheet with the most important negotiated items.109 Following these 
negotiations, a fully executed license agreement will then be signed 
by the university, typically the university research foundation, as the 
licensor. 
In some circumstances, a start-up entity called a spin-off will be 
created for the sole purpose of commercializing the technology.110 
In these cases, it may be that the academic inventor takes on a 
leadership or consulting role within the new start-up enterprise.111 
These steps are identified as a process flow diagram below in Figure 
2. 
 
 107 The policies at many universities allow the university to release the patent 
rights to the academic inventor. For example, at Florida State University the 
university may waive its rights to the invention. See FLORIDA STATE UNIV. – 
OFFICE OF COMMERCIALIZATION, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY INVENTION 
DISCLOSURE FORM 4, https://www.research.fsu.edu/media/4783/invention-
disclosure-form-blank.pdf. 
 108 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT: THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND THE UNITED FACULTY OF FLORIDA GENERAL FACULTY 
BARGAINING UNIT 2016–2019 1, 79 (2016). 
 109 See Valdimir Drozdoff & Darly Fairbairn, Licensing Biotech Intellectual 
Property in University-Industry Partnerships, 2015 COLD SPRING HARBOR 
PERSP. MED. 1, 4–6 (2015). 
 110 SCOTT SHANE, ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 173 (2004) (stating that 14 
percent of the time, new ventures are created to exploit university intellectual 
property and that it is important to note that university spinoff companies are 
atypical examples of start-up companies). 
 111 Id. at 151–164. 
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Figure 2. 
 
C. Internal TTO Challenges 
As discussed above, TTOs face significant challenges due to 
academia’s open science norms.112 The following constraints create 
additional hurdles for TTOs. 
1. Weak Incentives and Human Capital Deficits 
Patents can yield strong exclusionary property rights to the 
owner.113 The incentives offered to the TTO staff, however, are 
generally quite weak. This is particularly true of programs that fall 
outside of the leader programs.114 For example, licensing managers 
at most TTOs share no financial reward in the exploitation of patents 
through licensing. According to one TTO director, very few TTOs 
have a bonus system for their employees.115 The main financial 
benefits accrue to the university and the academic inventor through 
royalties. In industry, on the other hand, inventors and managers 
often obtain bonuses and promotions for patents that yield 
commercialization.116 
 
 112 See, e.g., Fabrizio & Di Minin, supra note 27. 
 113 Ayres & Ouellete, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing the social costs of patents 
that offer market power). 
 114 For example, a public record search revealed that the annual salary of David 
Day, former TTO Director at the University of Florida (an AAU member 
institution and a leader TTO) totaled $285,022. This compares the $109,191 
yearly salary of the TTO Director at Florida State University (not an AAU 
member institution and a laggard TTO). FLORIDA HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW, Florida 
State University System Employee Salaries, https://prod.flbog.net:4445/pls/ 
apex/f?p=140:1 [https://perma.cc/ECK5-DF2Q]. 
 115 Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96. 
 116 DONAL O’CONNELL, INSIDE THE PATENT FACTORY – THE ESSENTIAL 
REFERENCE FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF PATENT CREATION 
106 (2008). 
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Weak incentives within organizations create a human capital 
deficit.117 Under classical economic theory, rational agents seek to 
maximize their utility.118 Accordingly, the more talented and 
entrepreneurial licensing managers will seek greater financial 
rewards and employment elsewhere, likely in private industry or 
within leader TTOs. Thus, weak incentives often result in laggard 
institution TTOs with human capital deficits and that function 
bureaucratically rather than entrepreneurially.119 
The staff at laggard TTOs are mainly comprised of attorneys 
who emphasize legal processes and formalities centered around 
patenting rather than the deal-making or value creation process.120 
Many of these attorneys also lack business or entrepreneurial 
experience.121 The management of patents for commercialization 
and strategic advantage, however, requires a very different skill set 
that is more attuned to entrepreneurialism, technology marketing, 
and negotiations.122 According to one scholar, “TTOs should 
augment their legal expertise with persons possessing marketing, 
development, and entrepreneurial experience who can help develop 
long-term relationships with commercial partners and mediate 
potential conflicts.”123 
Several internal characteristics of TTOs impact the likelihood of 
developing a pipeline and trajectory of successful licensing. For 
example, researchers have measured the business and marketing 
expertise of TTO personnel as a determinant of technology transfer 
 
 117 See Michael A. Hitt et al., Direct and Moderating Effects of Human Capital 
on Strategy and Performance in Professional Service Firms: A Resource-Based 
Perspective, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 13, 13–28 (2001) (discussing how human capital 
is expensive for firms to maintain). 
 118 James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson, Toward a 
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OCT. 2019] University Technology Transfer 141 
success and found a positive correlation.124 Stanford, for example, is 
a leader institution and has a very successful track record of 
commercializing university research.125 Stanford adopted a unique 
model with respect to the internal staffing capabilities of its TTO. 
According to one source, the genesis of Stanford’s unique model 
originated with Niels Reimers, the founder of its TTO in 1968.126 
Reimers’ unique approach focused on marketing and business 
development rather than on the administrative and legal formalities 
of patenting.127 He staffed his TTO with individuals skilled in 
technology evaluation and marketing rather than the attorneys that 
traditionally staff the TTOs at most laggard institutions.128 
Stanford’s former President John Hennessey noted that the 
university’s success in technology transfer resulted from its 
technology transfer office’s willingness to take risks and to move 
technology quickly from the lab to the marketplace as opposed to 
narrowly focusing on drafting licensing arrangements aimed at 
maximizing royalty revenue.129 
2. The Absence of Complementary Assets and Capabilities 
TTOs lack the traditional strategic complementary assets that 
companies possess such as logistics, manufacturing, sales, 
marketing, and distribution.130 Private research and development 
(R&D) is integrated into an existing value ecosystem that tailors 
inventions within that system.131 This results in internal intellectual 
 
 124 Id.; see also Andy Locket & Mike Wright, Resources, Capabilities, Risk 
Capital and the Creation of University Spin-Out Companies, 34 RES. POL’Y  
1043–57 (2005); Donald S. Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact of Organizational 
Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer Offices: 
An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL’Y 27–48 (2003). 
 125 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 16, at 45. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 297. 
 130 David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285,  
288–90 (discussing the various strategic complementary assets required to profit 
from innovation). 
 131 See Shane, supra note 48, at 130–31 (“Universities differ from private firms 
in the ways in which they can appropriate private economic returns from the 
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property management and strategic decision-making capabilities 
that enable companies to focus on the commercial aspects of R&D 
within a company’s business model.132 This leads to activities such 
as: joint ventures, patent continuations, strategic patent landscaping, 
patent fencing, patent acquisitions, and cross-licenses to extract 
value from patenting.133 Universities, on the other hand, often have 
to rely on an external licensee to locate the business opportunity or 
“white space” and refine the technology to reach its full commercial 
potential.134 As stated by one TTO director “[w]e don’t know what’s 
going to be a success. The companies are responsible for product 
development and distribution.”135 The inability to tailor R&D 
investments to an existing value ecosystem places TTOs in a 
difficult situation since they must convince partners in industry of 
the largely uncertain and unproven merits of university 
technologies.136 
D. University TTO Leaders 
When one looks at the aggregate licensing statistics, the 
argument can be made that the Bayh-Dole Act increased social 
welfare if the assumption holds true that these licenses would not 
have been executed without patent rights to spur commercialization. 
For example, one study provided by the Association of University 
Technology Managers (AUTM) estimates that yearly licenses total 
nearly eight thousand and amount to $2.7 billion a year in royalty 
revenues.137 A large portion of those royalties, however, are derived 
from a few sizeable inventions at a handful of academic institutions. 
 
invention of new technology. Universities do not manufacture goods or provide 
services other than education, making it difficult for them to profit financially 
from inventions that must be incorporated into products or services before they 
can be sold.”). 
 132 Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary 
Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293,  
293–308 (2006). 
 133 See Robert C. Bird & David Orozco, Finding the Right Corporate Legal 
Strategy, 56 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 81, 81–90 (2014). 
 134 Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Devine, supra note 88. 
 135 Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96. 
 136 Shane, supra note 48, at 130. 
 137 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2010). 
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The concentration is largely the effect of a few blockbuster cases. 
For example, in 2010 the top fifteen university TTOs generated 52% 
of all the licensing revenues among 155 universities sampled.138 
Tables 1 and 2 identify the fifteen highest earning university TTOs 
in 2010 and 2014. 
 
Table 1. Top Fifteen TTO programs in 2010139 
1. Northwestern University  $180 million 
2. New York University  $178 million 
3. Columbia University $147 million 
4. University of California System  $104 million 
5. Wake Forest University  $86 million 
6. University of Minnesota  $84 million 
7. Massachusetts Institute of Technology  $69 million 
8. University of Washington  $69 million 
9. Stanford University  $65 million 
10. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation  $54 million 
11. California Institute of Technology  $52 million 
12. University of Rochester  $42 million 
13. University of Massachusetts  $40 million 
14. University of Michigan  $40 million 






 138 Id. 
 139 Id. Data compiled by the author from this source. 
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Table 2. Top Fifteen TTO programs in 2014140 
1. New York University    $211 million 
2.  Columbia University $164 million  
3.  Princeton University  $135 million  
4.  University of Washington $96 million  
5.  University of California System $74 million 
6.  Stanford University  $72 million  
7.  Massachusetts Institute of Technology   $40 million        
8.  Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation   $38 million     
9.   University of Texas System  $32 million        
10. University of Florida  $29 million         
11. University of Massachusetts  $28 million         
12. University of Illinois Chicago  $27 million         
13. University of Pittsburgh  $27 million         
14. Duke University  $25 million 
15. University of Rochester  $22 million        
 
From a purely financial perspective, successful TTOs are those 
that consistently show profitability. These TTOs have been 
described as belonging to a select club.141 For purposes of this study, 
leader TTOs are defined as the universities that have reached the top 
twenty in licensing revenue at least five times during the most recent 
ten-year reporting period. Everyone else is referred to as a laggard 




 140 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY (2014). Data 
compiled by the author from this source. 
 141 VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 6. 
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Table 3. The Leader Institutions 
New York University 
Columbia University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Northwestern University 
University of California System 
University of Washington 
Stanford University 
University of Massachusetts 
University of Minnesota 
University of Wisconsin 
University of Rochester 
University of Utah 
University of Florida 
University of Colorado 
California Institute of Technology 
Emory University 
University of Michigan 
Harvard University 
University of Iowa 
Wake Forest University 
 
Several successful TTO programs are not included in the leader 
category since they were included in a top twenty grouping due to a 
rare blockbuster event. This can skew the results and mask the fact 
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that the program is not sustainable over the long term.142 To avoid 
this over-inclusive sampling bias, a program has to have a greater 
than fifty percent chance of being listed in the top twenty ranking 
within the past ten years. The leaders are thus programs that 
continually run successful TTO programs and do not rely on the rare 
and infrequent blockbuster event. 
V. TTO BEHAVIOR EXPLAINED 
This part offers a theoretical justification to explain why laggard 
institutions engage in technology transfer if it is so costly and the 
payoffs are so uncertain. The Bayh-Dole Act encouraged a dramatic 
increase in university patenting. The sponsors of that statute did not 
contemplate, however, that most of this patenting activity would 
yield losses for the vast majority of universities. On the surface, 
university patenting resembles a lottery, which from an economic 
standpoint is irrational behavior.143 The justification for maintaining 
a TTO does not exist if technology transfer is viewed solely in terms 
of revenues versus costs. Instead, laggard TTOs are influenced by 
signaling, social pressures explained by institutional theory, the 
expected value of achieving a blockbuster technology transfer event 
and positive spillover effects. 
A. Transaction Cost Economics 
Under the classic make-or-buy scenario, established transaction 
cost economics theory suggests that if transaction costs are high, 
universities will not contract with third parties and will buy or 
insource patent commercialization activities.144 Transaction costs in 
the TTO context include title, search, and enforcement costs. Title 
costs were substantially decreased after the Bayh-Dole Act since 
 
 142 See infra pp. 31–38. For example, Florida State University was ranked in the 
top twenty a few years due to the major success of Taxol; however, this proved to 
be a rare event. 
 143 Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 71, 75–79 (1994). 
 144 Id.; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1649, 1661 (2009). 
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that Act clarified ownership and licensing of university-related 
patents.145 Search costs include the costs of finding appropriate 
inventions, that is, academic inventors who provide promising 
invention disclosures and suitable licensees who will commercialize 
the technology. In many respects, TTO offices function as 
matchmakers between academic inventors and commercial 
enterprises. Enforcement costs relate to policing a licensee’s 
compliance through royalty audits and the pursuit of litigation in 
cases where an infringer refuses to pay a license. 
Litigation costs are not prohibitive since they are largely a 
function of attorney’s fees and are well-known in advance. The 
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) surveys 
patent-related litigation costs every year.146 Although patent 
litigation is an expensive process, the costs are well-defined a priori 
and rational economic decisions can be made in relation to whether 
it is efficient to pursue litigation against infringers.147 Since title and 
 
 145 See Lee, supra note 49, at 1512 (“As a general matter, one could characterize 
the Bayh-Dole Act and the rise of university patenting as attempts to facilitate 
market-based transfer of academic technologies to the private sector for 
commercialization.”); Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration that 
Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science is Not Always in the 
Public Interest, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 378 (2000) (“Until the passage of the 
Act, universities were forced to deal with a myriad of different policies regarding 
research funding and ownership of inventions. In total, twenty-six different 
agency regulations existed, all of them presumptively granting the government 
title to federally funded inventions. It was difficult, time-consuming, and risky for 
universities to overcome the presumptions of federal title.”). 
 146 Proceeding to a jury verdict is notoriously expensive. For example, 
according to the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the 
average cost of a jury trial for a patent infringement lawsuit ranges between 
$970,000 and $5.9 million, depending on the amount of damages at stake. 2013 
Report of the Economic Survey, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (2013), 
https://www.aipla.org/detail/journal-issue/2013-report-of-the-economic-survey 
[https://perma.cc/B373-NJXX]. 
 147 For example, the market for financing commercial litigation in general has 
evolved into a highly specialized and sophisticated specialty area of finance. See 
Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 
460–61 (2012) (discussing how litigation financing “relates to the funding of 
business disputes, such as disputes relating to intellectual property, antitrust, 
business contracts, and international commercial and investment arbitration 
brought by sophisticated parties and involving larger stakes”). 
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litigation costs are well-defined and not prohibitively expensive, 
universities outsource the ownership and litigation of university 
patents to third parties, namely university research foundations 
organized as separate legal entities. Search costs, however, remain 
high and uncertain since universities are in the best position to find 
the academic inventors who will submit promising invention 
disclosures and commercial licenses. As predicted by transaction 
cost economics theory, this function is largely insourced by the 
university through its TTO. 
Transaction cost economics is a useful theory to explain the 
emergence of TTOs and research foundations since each 
organizational entity addresses a different aspect of university 
patenting and the related transaction costs. Although it is a useful 
theory, transaction cost economics does not explain why laggard 
institutions continue to engage in technology transfer efforts when 
on average they sustain considerable losses every year.148 
B. Institutional Theory and Signaling 
Institutional theory explains what seems like irrational behavior 
incentivized by the Bayh-Dole Act. This theory recognizes that 
organizations operate within a social framework of norms, values, 
and assumptions regarding what constitutes acceptable modes of 
economic behavior.149 This theory posits that motives of human 
behavior extend beyond economic optimization to include social 
justification and social obligation.150 A central question institutional 
 
 148 But see Lee, supra note 49, at 1535. Professor Lee argues that technology 
transfer is explained by the tacit knowledge that must be transferred between the 
inventor and the licensee. The relational nature of technology transfer, he argues, 
explains why so few TTOs are not outsourced but are instead insourced. This is 
in line with transaction cost economics since the highly personal nature of 
contracting tacit knowledge increases transaction costs and leads to insourcing. 
This article agrees with Professor Lee’s conclusions; however, it brings to light 
the institutional theory aspects that help explain why universities sustain TTO-
related losses year-after-year. 
 149 See generally Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage: 
Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 697, 
697–713 (1997); Bercovitz & Feldman, supra note 25, at 181. 
 150 STRUCTURES OF CAPITAL: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY  
1–37 (Sharon Zukin & Paul DiMaggio eds., 1990). 
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theorists ask is: ‘Why do so many organizations act and look the 
same?’151 Institutional isomorphism, or the processes in which 
organizations resemble one another, helps to explain similarities 
across institutions.152 Universities exhibit traits of institutional 
isomorphism, whereby the laggard organizations mimic the 
behavior of a select group of leader programs to achieve legitimacy, 
even if these activities routinely create losses. There are three main 
types of institutional isomorphism identified in the organizational 
behavior literature: normative, coercive, and mimetic.153 Normative 
isomorphism involves professional standards that result in 
uniformity.154 Coercive isomorphism refers to formal and informal 
pressures that originate from non-professional actors, such as 
regulators and policymakers.155 Mimetic isomorphism occurs when 
organizations mimic others to reduce risk and uncertainty.156 All 
three explain the seemingly irrational persistence of TTOs within 
laggard institutions after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
1. Normative Isomorphism 
Laggard TTOs face normative isomorphism due to the 
aspirational goals reflected within university associations and 
standards. Since some universities have successful leader TTOs, the 
argument is laggard universities should likewise have TTOs, if 
anything just to resemble the elite group they aspire to join. Whereas 
TTOs, such as WARF, originally emerged from the entrepreneurial 
efforts of key individuals, university administrators today face 
pressure from within their professional communities, that is other 
universities, to normatively adopt these structures. 
Normative pressure stems from the fact that most leader 
universities belong to the prestigious American Association of 
Universities (AAU). Seventeen of the twenty leader TTOs (85%) 
listed in Table 3 are housed within universities that belong to the 
 
 151 Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 
AM. SOC. REV. 147, 148 (1983). 
 152 Id. at 149. 
 153 Id. at 150. 
 154 Id. at 152. 
 155 Id. at 150. 
 156 Id. at 151. 
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AAU.157 This group comprises the elite grouping of research 
universities in the U.S. and Canada and virtually every research-
oriented university aspires to join this cadre.158 The AAU recognizes 
the impact of technology transfer and takes an active leadership role 
in this area, disseminating best practices and policy objectives.159 
Universities that seek to belong to this elite group will seek to 
resemble AAU institutions and will devote significant resources to 
technology transfer every year, even if these activities are not 
financially viable. 
2. Coercive Isomorphism 
TTOs remain prevalent at laggard institutions due to coercive 
isomorphism.160 Coercive isomorphism occurs when pressures to 
persist and conform arise outside of any professional associations.161 
In the case of TTOs, this pressure arises from governmental and 
regulatory sources. This source of pressure is considerable since the 
federal government provides $32 billion worth of research funding 
every year.162 Federal acts and congressional oversight hearings 
signal the importance of public accountability through highly visible 
statements from public officials that favor technology 
 
 157 All of the universities listed in Table 3 belong to the AAU, except the 
University of Massachusetts, University of Utah and Wake Forest University. 
ASS’N OF AM. U., AAU MEMBER U., https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/ 
AAU-Files/Who-We-Are/AAU-Member-Universities--Admission-Year.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HX93-5RW4]. 
 158 Membership into the AAU is by invitation-only and the group comprises a 
select group of elite universities. Membership in the AAU is a great point of 
distinction and helps to drive rankings. See Phyllis V. Larsen, Academic 
Reputation: How U.S. News & World Report Survey Respondents Form 
Perceptions, 4 CASE INT’L J. EDUC. ADVANCEMENT 155, 159 (2003) (discussing 
how membership in the AAU helps respondents in a ranking survey to determine 
the academic reputation of a university). 
 159 ASS’N of AM. U., AAU TECH. TRANSFER WORKING GROUP STATEMENT ON 
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commercialization.163 Legislation and executive actions signal a 
preference for the commercialization of research supported with 
public funds. 
The Bayh-Dole Act itself can be viewed as a source of coercive 
isomorphism since its legislative history and purpose signal the 
federal government’s interest in promoting university technology 
transfer and commercialization.164 Universities are thus likely to feel 
obligated to maintain TTOs to support the goals of this important 
federal legislation and demonstrate that they are good stewards of 
federal research funding. Maintaining a TTO is important to ensure 
adequate levels of federal research funding going forward and their 
participation in CRADAs with federal agencies such as the National 
Insitute of Health. 
In the case of state universities, legislative pressure may exist if 
performance funds are tied to metrics that include patenting and 
technology transfer. For example, in Florida the legislature awards 
university performance funding and preeminent university 
classifications based on a variety of metrics, one of which is the 
amount of patenting.165 
3. Mimetic Isomorphism 
The existence of TTOs can also be impacted by mimetic 
isomorphism.166 This third type of pressure arises from 
uncertainty.167 Since running a successful technology 
commercialization program is rare and difficult, the uncertainty 
levels are high. This uncertainty pressures institutions to imitate 
 
 163 See COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A 
GUIDE TO THE LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2 (1999). 
 164 See Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 
93, 95 (2004) (describing the statements made by WARF’s Howard Bremer in 
support of the proposed act); see Government Patent Policies: Institutional Patent 
Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive 
Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 373–80 (1978) 
(statement of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wis. Alumni Res. Found). 
 165 See FLA. STAT. § 1001.7065 (2017) (stating that a university’s attainment of 
one hundred or more patents during the most recent 3-year period is one of the 
metrics for establishing academic and research excellence standards). 
 166 See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 151. 
 167 Id. 
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successful programs to reduce risk and “play it safe.” This approach, 
however, is an ineffective short-cut or heuristic since it 
simplistically assumes that replicating a successful structure will 
yield success. The result is that many governing university boards 
ask themselves “[w]hy can’t our state university be just like [MIT] 
or Stanford University and make technology transfer into a 
profitable operation.”168 As most TTOs demonstrate, however, the 
act of establishing these offices does not automatically yield 
success. Mimetic isomorphism can nonetheless be a powerful force. 
As stated by one TTO director, universities invest in TTOs “to 
dream big and discover the next [blockbuster].”169 
C. Expected Value Theory and Positive Spillovers 
Universities behave rationally if one considers the expected 
value of technology transfer. According to one study, the odds of a 
blockbuster technology transfer event are positively correlated with 
the size of the university’s research budget.170 The size of the 
university’s research budget is a predictor since more research 
translates into more invention disclosures. The odds of a blockbuster 
decrease dramatically, on the other hand, as research budgets 
decrease.171 Universities, however, may rationally view technology 
transfer payoffs from an expected value standpoint. An expected 
value multiplies the probability of an event, such as a blockbuster 
patent, times the gains associated with that event.172 Since the gains 
of a blockbuster patent can reach billions of dollars, universities will 
invest in technology transfer even if the odds are fairly low. 
Lastly, universities may continue to spend on technology 
transfer to achieve positive spillovers that are not properly 
accounted for in a narrowly defined cost-benefit analysis. Some 
positive spillovers that occur from technology transfer are the ability 
to strengthen industry and government agency relationships through 
licensing, improved reputation among key stakeholders such as the 
 
 168 Woodell & Smith, supra note 84, at 297. 
 169 Telephone Interview with Brent Edington, supra note 96. 
 170 VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
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 172 Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 
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community and alumni, the creation of spin-offs that may not 
generate immediate licensing revenues, and the ability to obtain 
funding from local, state and federal sources to create incubators and 
research parks.173 
VI. THE TAXOL CASE 
This part provides an empirical perspective of technology 
transfer through a discussion of a blockbuster technology transfer 
event at Florida State University (FSU). Although one single case 
cannot provide conclusive or generalizable findings, this case has 
high probative value since it involves a research-oriented university 
with a sizeable research budget that remains in the laggard category 
despite managing a blockbuster technology-transfer event.174 The 
Taxol case at FSU, therefore, provides a lens through which 
technology transfer can be applied to many laggard organizations 
with sizable research programs that aspire to develop leader TTO 
programs. Data from the case includes archival sources, interviews, 
and print publications. 
A. Case Background 
Prior to the arrival of FSU’s first TTO director Michael Devine 
in 1987, FSU had only a handful of patents that provided negligible 
licensing revenues.175 The university had no formal TTO in place 
until Devine’s arrival and one attorney was on staff to handle the 
university’s entire technology transfer workload.176 It can be fairly 
stated that the university had no real antecedents or culture to 
support technology transfer prior to Devine’s arrival. One day a 
chemistry professor by the name of Dr. Robert Holton arrived at 
 
 173 VALDIVIA, supra note 6, at 16. 
 174 FSU is classified as a “R1 Doctoral University” having the highest research 
activity under the well-known and utilized Carnegie Classification of Institutions 
of Higher Education. See Doctoral Universities, THE CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION 
OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUC., http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/lookup/ 
srp.php?clq=%7B%22basic2005_ids%22%3A%2215%22%7D&start_page=sta
ndard.php&backurl=standard.php&limit=0,50 [https://perma.cc/GW2S-FNDU] 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2019). 
 175 A search of patents registered to Florida State University prior to 1987 at 
uspto.gov yielded only seven results. 
 176 Telephone Interview with Michael Devine, supra note 88. 
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Devine’s office to discuss his patent applications related to the 
synthesis and partial synthesis of the Taxol molecule that had 
exhibited promise in cancer treatments.177 
The FSU Taxol case must be historically assessed in light of the 
many significant antecedents that led to Dr. Holton’s breakthrough 
inventions. First among these was that in the 1960’s a bark 
derivative from the Pacific Yew tree known as Taxol was 
discovered.178 In 1965, Drs. Monroe Wall and Mansukh Wani, 
located in the Research Triangle area of North Carolina had 
collaborated with the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to identify 
K172 as the substance in the Pacific Yew tree with cancer-fighting 
properties. In 1971, these two scientists published Taxol’s molecular 
structure in the Journal of the American Chemical Society.179 
In 1979, Dr. Susan B. Horwitz of the Albert Einstein Medical 
College discovered and published the unique mechanisms in Taxol 
that fight cancer cells in the journal Nature.180 Her astonishing 
findings related to Taxol’s unique anti-cancer fighting properties 
created strong interest in the academic world. In 1982, Dr. Holton 
wrote his first Taxol-related paper after receiving tenure at Virginia 
Tech. Although he had expressed interest in pursuing Taxol-related 
research during his early years as an academic, he viewed it as too 
risky for someone who had not yet earned tenure.181 
In 1985, Dr. Holton followed his wife Dr. Marie Krafft, a rising 
star in the field of synthetic organic chemistry to FSU.182 During the 
years 1984–1998 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved Taxol for Phase 1 and 2 clinical trials in humans. The drug 
showed promise, however, 240 pounds of the drug would require 
 
 177 Id. 
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felling 360,000 Pacific Yew trees. Conservationists voiced 
opposition to these massive logging efforts and the sustainability of 
producing the drug was called into question. 
In 1988, the NCI had decided it needed to stop procuring Taxol 
derived from Pacific Yew trees due to its high expense. Dr. Matthew 
Suffness oversaw the NCI’s Taxol program and he contacted Dr. 
Holton to persuade him to investigate a semi-synthesis to develop 
Taxol in a lab to ensure adequate low-cost supply. Prior to this 
important phone call, Holton had been primarily interested in a full 
synthesis of the Taxol molecule, which was viewed as the academic 
“Mount Everest” of synthetic chemistry.183 Like most academic 
researchers who operate within Bohr’s research quadrant, Holton 
was not interested in the applied commercialization aspects of the 
much more promising and economically feasible semi-synthesis 
approach.184 During that call with Suffness, Holton learned that 
Taxol would likely become an approved drug.185 Having learned 
this, Holton then oriented his research efforts toward the Taxol 
semi-synthesis.186 
In 1989, Holton’s team developed a cost-effective Taxol semi-
synthesis.187 That year the NCI had signed a cooperative research 
and development agreement (CRADA) with Bristol-Myers Squibb 
(BMS), assigning them exclusive rights to commercialize Taxol for 
anti-cancer therapies.188 In 1990, BMS then signed an exclusive 
patent license with FSU to use Dr. Holton’s patented inventions 
related to the Taxol semi-synthesis.189 In 1993, BMS introduced 
Taxol to the market and used Dr. Holton’s commercially-efficient 
synthesis method.190 By 1999, Dr. Holton’s lab at FSU had generated 
nearly 60 patents and just one year later BMS Taxol-related sales 
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reached $1.6 billion.191 In total, FSU received nearly $350 million 
dollars in Taxol-related royalties.192 
B. Taxol Technology Transfer Success Factors 
Findings from this case illustrate that each of the following were 
important factors that yielded a highly unusual and successful 
technology transfer event at FSU, a laggard TTO institution. 
1. A Problem Looking for a Solution 
The Taxol case was unique since the scientific and 
commercialization challenges were well-defined a priori. A semi-
synthesis of Taxol was necessary to ensure a reliable and cost-
effective supply of the compound.193 Taxol, as the FDA clinical 
trials had already demonstrated, evidenced strong promise as an 
anti-cancer medication.194 This scenario contrasts with many other 
academic inventions, which rarely have a clear commercial solution 
to an identified problem in the marketplace. In many instances, 
academic inventions are solutions looking for a problem whereas the 
Taxol case involved the opposite, a problem looking for a solution. 
This somewhat singular aspect of the Taxol case may help explain 
why FSU has not achieved anything remotely similar in terms of 
patent commercialization and why it remains in the laggard TTO 
category. 
2. Depth of Relational Capital with Key External 
Stakeholders 
Another key insight taken from the case is that technology and 
innovation do not occur in a vacuum.195 Dr. Holton’s Taxol semi-
synthesis required deep collaborations with partners within and 
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external to his lab. These external partnerships included the NCI 
which spent millions of dollars funding his Taxol-related research. 
External collaborations crossed over into industry with the CRADA 
executed between the NCI and BMS and also the license agreement 
executed between FSU and BMS. The lesson is that relationship 
capital with key external stakeholders in the private and public 
sectors should be a foundational element of any successful 
technology transfer strategy.196 Likewise, the prompting by Suffness 
at the NCI that motivated Holton to approach the problem from an 
applied commercialization perspective highlights how external 
partners can be important information conduits and unexpected 
motivators. It was Suffness at the NCI who motivated Dr. Holton to 
shift his research focus and move from Bohr’s quadrant to Pascal’s 
quadrant.197 
3. The Inspired and Motivated Academic Inventor 
Dr. Holton was initially intrigued by the challenge of achieving 
a full synthesis of Taxol.198 That is where his original research 
passion and drive resided.199 This emphasis on basic research is 
characteristic of academic researchers and scientists.200 Holton was 
able to cross into the practical dimension of the problem once he 
was motivated to do so by his momentous phone call with Suffness 
at the NCI. This process illustrates how he migrated closer into 
Pascal’s quadrant of applied research.201 Prior to the phone call with 
Suffness, Holton was skeptical that Taxol could be commercialized 
as a drug. As Holton recalled, “[Suffness] knew what the story was 
better than anybody. He said ‘Bob, this one’s gonna be a drug, and 
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somebody’s gotta figure out how to make it.’ After that call, I 
realized I needed to change my way of thinking.”202 
This suggests that some successful technology transfer activities 
require deep levels of engagement and commitment from academic 
inventors. Studies show that tacit knowledge gained from relational 
forms of governance, for example consulting engagements, are 
positively associated with successful cases of university technology 
transfer.203 Relational engagements such as consulting or technical 
assistance are more likely to emerge, however, when academic 
inventors are passionate about the practical dimensions of their 
research. This passion can emerge from various sources. For Dr. 
Holton, it was the call from Dr. Suffness urging him to turn a dream 
into a reality that would result in saving many lives. For Dr. 
Steenbok, the University of Wisconsin professor, inventor, and co-
founder of WARF it was his desire to promote improved nutrition 
and ensure that his technology would be widely distributed to the 
public in a safe, ethical, and responsible manner.204 Passion of this 
sort that extends beyond the financial rewards of licensing is likely 
an important motivator to encourage the academic inventor to shift 
into Pascal’s quadrant and work with industry to advance the 
commercial and socio-ethical aspects of technology. 
4. The Role of Serendipity and Organizational Learning 
An aspect that is often overlooked in technology transfer is the 
important role of serendipity. According to Mike Devine’s recalling 
of the Taxol case: 
This was serendipity. Bob was the right person at the 
right time. And I was the right person at the right time 
to help get this invention licensed, and I respected 
him. NCI already had the BMS contract [CRADA]. 
FSU had nothing to do with the fact that it sold a 
billion dollars a year.205 
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Dr. Holton likewise described the Taxol case as a fortunate 
incident when he stated: “[w]e got lucky that all this money came to 
us.”206 Serendipity has played an important role in other high-profile 
university technology commercialization success stories. 
Northwestern University’s blockbuster discovery of pregabalin was 
later described as a “serendipitous discovery.” In that case, the 
academic inventor “had no idea that one molecule he made would 
ever be useful for anything.”207 
An appreciation of the role of serendipity introduces a level of 
realism to technology transfer dialogues and mitigates the 
misconceived notion that every invention will be a blockbuster, or 
that the TTO should consistently operate as a profit center. That does 
not mean that luck alone will dictate results, as if a lottery system 
were in effect. The Taxol case illustrates that important success 
factors such as increased research budgets, key external 
partnerships, and enhanced motivation driving the academic 
inventor can increase the odds, albeit low, of achieving a 
blockbuster event. 
Serendipity is likely to play a much greater role, however, in 
laggard institutions that lack extensive research budgets and the 
path-dependent capabilities of leader institutions.208 Path 
dependence has been defined by scholars as a process that includes 
singular historical events, which may under certain conditions 
transform themselves into self-reinforcing dynamics that generate 
lock-in or persistence over time.209 For example, some of the 
capabilities that likely contribute to TTO success are effective 
knowledge management and entrepreneurialism.210 These unique 
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capabilities seem to be present due to the efforts of key individuals 
who succeed in transforming the cultural and intellectual 
competencies of TTOs. The success of these efforts is retained 
within leader organizations and persist over time in a path-
dependent manner. The lack of learning within FSU’s TTO, on the 
other hand, was apparent since knowledge of the Taxol case was 
insufficiently maintained within that office. The author, for 
example, requested the Taxol license agreements between BMS and 
FSU. No one within the TTO had retained these important 
documents. An old incomplete draft agreement was eventually 
retrieved from an off-campus warehouse. This indicates that the 
TTO has not maintained a data repository related to the most 
successful TTO event within that organization’s history.211 Lacking 
this important historical data creates a learning deficit for future 
TTO negotiations. In essence, the lack of institutional knowledge 
about that past success of Taxol is indicative of a dearth at FSU of 
the market-focused, entrepreneurial-spirited TTO culture that 
characterizes leader institutions. 
C. Summary of the Taxol Case Findings 
It is tempting to view the Taxol case as further evidence of Bayh-
Dole’s success. Yet, the evidence indicates that this event was 
somewhat of an anomaly and that laggard universities are influenced 
by normative pressures and play a probabilistic game that can 
sometimes yield positive results from the expected value theory of 
technology transfer. The institutional pressure for FSU to continue 
patenting remains high. The university aspires, for example, to the 
join the elite grouping of AAU-member institutions. Seventeen of 
the twenty leader TTOs belong to this prestigious association.212 
Also, the Florida Legislature uses patenting as a metric in its yearly 
performance funding allocations. As the university’s research 
profile and budget increases, it will likely use patent metrics to 
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signal its commitment to research and to demonstrate the impact its 
research has on society.213 
Patenting has generated positive spillovers at the university. As 
a result of the hundreds of millions of dollars generated by Taxol, 
the FSU Research Foundation is flush with resources.214 This helps 
support university-related projects, such as endowed professorships 
and capital expenditure projects that involve STEM-based research 
labs.215 Yet, to maximize the chances of future success, FSU’s TTO 
will likely have to strengthen its knowledge management practices. 
Further empirical studies may demonstrate that the Bayh-Dole 
Act simply strengthened the hand of universities such as Stanford, 
MIT, and the University of Wisconsin that already had a path-
dependent technology commercialization capability. 
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, the Bayh-Dole Act stimulated university patenting and 
licensing. Several negative and unintended consequences have 
emerged in light of the statute, however, that present a problem from 
a public policy standpoint. These include: A) universities 
increasingly engaging in predatory behavior that mimics private 
industry; and B) the disproportionate concentration of wealth and 
success among leader institutions. If left unmitigated, these negative 
consequences may threaten to overshadow the success of Bayh-Dole 
and can trigger calls for legislative reform. Efforts to reform or 
weaken Bayh-Dole in turn may kill the proverbial goose that lays 
the golden eggs. This part will address these dangers and offer 
prescriptive solutions to address them. 
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A. University Predatory Practices 
University administrators are guardians of the broad public-
oriented missions of universities. Sometimes, this purpose clashes 
with the narrower financial interests of privately funded research. 
For example, in some cases, industry requires secrecy, and this may 
prevent the academic inventor from sharing their findings with the 
broader scientific community. There have been troubling instances 
where industry stifles discussion if the academic findings they have 
sponsored are contrary to their financial interests.216 For example, 
corporate sponsors may stifle debate and disclosure through the use 
of restrictive confidentiality agreements that prevent academic 
researchers from speaking about their findings.217 In some disturbing 
instances, private parties may litigate or threaten to sue to intimidate 
and harass academic researchers.218 Administrators must preserve 
the unique and open culture of universities and guard against overly-
aggressive or predatory patenting and licensing practices even if it 
means sacrificing short-term financial research commitments or 
taking a hard stance against corporate sponsors. 
The successful commercialization of university inventions has 
generated unexpected conflicts. For example, universities have 
increasingly been parties to patent litigation. Recently, state 
universities have purchased patents from companies and granted 
exclusive licenses back to those companies. This is done to assert 
sovereign immunity against parties who seek to challenge the 
patents in administrative proceedings.219 This calls into question 
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whether state universities should offer their sovereign immunity for 
sale.220 In other cases, universities have been derisively labeled 
patent trolls due to their aggressive patent assertions and litigation 
postures. For example, in December 2012, Carnegie Mellon 
University was awarded a $1.17 billion jury verdict in a patent 
infringement suit against Marvell Technology Group.221 WARF has 
likewise drawn criticism due to its aggressive litigation and large 
patent verdicts. In October 2015, a jury awarded WARF $234 
million against Apple, Inc. in a patent lawsuit.222 
This behavior has led the AAU to issue a report related to 
universities that litigate patents and recommends several best 
practices such as restraint, cooperation, and using patents to promote 
public welfare.223 The report, for example, advises universities to 
avoid selling patents to patent trolls and to employ non-exclusive 
licenses.224 The AAU’s recommendations are sound since Congress 
may decide, in light of the negative consequences associated with 
university patenting, to revisit Bayh-Dole or implement other 
legislation that restricts university technology transfer. All 
universities, leaders and laggards, should adopt and implement these 
recommendations as a code of conduct and best practices to be 
followed by university research foundations and TTOs. 
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University administrators may also be tempted to treat research 
as simply a means to achieve commercialization success and much-
needed funds. Given its highly uncertain nature, however, it would 
be risky to view technology transfer as a remedy against falling 
appropriations or dwindling tuition revenues. If anything, 
technology transfer should be treated as one element of a much 
larger strategy that involves funding sources and external 
stakeholder engagement. According to Mike Devine, FSU’s former 
TTO director, “[i]f the purpose of the TTO is to make money, you’re 
going to be seriously disappointed.”225 University administrators, 
nonetheless, may be tempted to see TTOs as a means to increase 
their institutional profiles and endowments in light of a few 
blockbuster examples.226 
Another danger facing university administrators is the 
temptation to place too much emphasis on certain areas of academic 
research that have an applied commercial focus. For example, a 
good deal of research in natural sciences consists of basic research, 
whereas other fields such as medicine naturally favor applied 
science.227 It may be tempting for policymakers and university 
administrators to favor certain disciplines over others in terms of 
faculty hiring or research funding commitments. This could distort 
the traditional university model of cooperation and support across 
departmental units. The danger is real since a university association 
recently recommended that technology transfer be included within 
faculty tenure and promotion criteria.228 This type of short-sighted 
policy could have drastic and negative consequences for the 
collaborative spirit of universities and their mission to promote basic 
research and scholarly inquiry. 
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B. Skewed Value Distribution 
The skewed distribution of TTO success among leaders is also 
problematic and contrary to the spirit of Bayh-Dole as a federal act. 
If left unabated, the public trust in the efficacy of Bayh-Dole may 
be eroded due to the perception that very few elite institutions with 
large endowments are the ones benefitting from this statutory 
scheme at the expense of the public and taxpayer support. It is 
therefore, incumbent upon leader organizations to share best 
practices with laggard institutions to disseminate knowledge of 
ways to capitalize on technology commercialization. Since it 
appears that leaders have path-dependent capabilities that allow 
them to continually place within the leader category, there are 
unique internal practices that yield success and these should be more 
broadly discussed and disseminated through professional 
associations and conferences. 
For example, some leader TTOs provide incentives to increase 
their human capital.229 A more enlightened management approach 
could also emphasize smaller and medium-sized transactions that 
generate trust with commercial partners, facilitate learning and 
increase deal flow. Relying on a blockbuster event is speculative and 
as the Taxol case demonstrates it does not necessarily promote 
learning or provide the foundation for future success. A suitable 
forum for disseminating these best practices may be an organization 
like AUTM, where TTO managers converge within a professional 
association. Leader organizations should take a proactive role to 
diffuse best practices so that more TTOs are at least financially self-
sufficient and in a better position to achieve licensing opportunities 
and success. 
The failure to address this concern may spark calls to limit 
university technology transfer or place a tax on this activity. It is 
worth noting that the original version of the bill included provisions 
designed to defuse criticism that it would lead to profiteering at the 
expense of the public interest. This included a recoupment provision 
requiring that universities pay back a share of licensing income to 
funding agencies.230 The final version of the Bayh-Dole Act 
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eliminated this provision since “there was no agreement on whether 
the funds would be returned to the agencies or to general revenue, 
or how the collection and auditing functions would be conducted” 
and “fears that the costs of the infrastructure required to administer 
such a program would exceed the amounts collected.”231 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Universities are unique environments that thrive on the research 
activities of faculty and students. A substantial amount of innovation 
results from the creative endeavors of these individuals. To 
disseminate knowledge and potentially derive lucrative sources of 
funding, universities have entered the field of technology 
commercialization and patenting. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 
was instrumental to encourage this activity and the result has been 
an explosion of university-related patenting and licensing. 
Thirty-nine years have passed since the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act. On the whole, the statute’s purpose has been fulfilled 
regarding the increased rates of patent commercialization of 
federally-sponsored research at U.S.-based universities.232 Indeed, 
the biotechnology industry is largely a product of the statute’s 
success.233 That is not to say, however, that negative unintended 
consequences did not arise. Notably, the statute has reified the 
success at a few elite institutions with path-dependent capabilities 
and labeled here as leaders in the technology transfer field. Laggard 
institutions attempt to mimic the leaders’ success and institutional 
theory explains why so many laggards do this despite having low 
probabilities of achieving success. In some isolated examples, 
serendipity plays a large role in blockbuster events, such as the case 
of FSU with its blockbuster Taxol semi-synthesis patents. 
Several policy implications arise from the analysis of university-
based technology transfer from the perspective of TTOs. First, 
technology transfer should not be viewed narrowly in terms of 
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financial costs and benefits.234 It is clear that technology transfer 
yields positive spillovers that extend beyond licensing revenues.235 
For example, technology transfer has an important signaling role 
since it allows universities to highlight their commitment to research 
advancement as well as the positive impact of the university’s 
research on society.236 Second, two major negative and unintended 
consequences of Bayh-Dole include the increasingly predatory 
commercial behavior of universities and the skewed value 
distribution of TTO success. To address these concerns university 
administrators who are the trustees and gatekeepers of public-
oriented institutions must recognize the negative consequences of 
this behavior and adopt policies that prioritize the public missions 
of universities. Finally, to address the skewed value distribution, 
leader TTOs should take a more active role disseminating best 
practices among laggard TTOs to avoid the perception of unfair and 
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